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Medical Care and Procompetitive
Reform
T. R. Marmor,* Richard Boyer,** and Julie Greenberg***
I. INTRODUCTION: REFORM WITHOUT REGULATION
During the 1970s the focus of debate about national health
policy shifted from issues of access to medical care and the distri-
bution of the cost of care to concern about controlling the total
cost of care. The rapid rate of growth of expenditures on medical
care during that decade far exceeded the rate of inflation in the
general economy, with the result that an increasing proportion of
the gross national product (GNP) is now expended on medical
care. In 1970 the United States spent 7.6% of its GNP on health
care;1 by 1980 the proportion had increased to over 9.1%.2
The conclusion that the marginal cost of care, is greater than
the resulting marginal health benefits is more distressing to some
observers than the rate of growth itself. As a consequence, politi-
cians and policy analysts alike have scrutinized medical expendi-
tures severely. This impulse to scrutinize is startling when one re-
members the public and elite attitudes about medical care that
prevailed from after World War II until the mid-1960s. During
that period, medical care and its providers were held in almost un-
paralleled esteem. There was faith in medical progress and broad
agreement about the value of social investment in medical care.
Today, however, our faith in medicine has been rudely and proba-
bly irrevocably shaken by evidence that medicine's real influence
on the quality of our lives probably reached its zenith with the
decline of infectious disease mortality.
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** B.A., 1979, Michigan State University; M.P.H., 1981, Yale University.
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1. U.S. DEPARTmENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HEALTH UNITED STATEs: 1979,
at 184 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 80-1232 1980) (table 64).
2. Gibson, National Health Expenditures, 1978, 1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 1
(Summer 1979).
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Critics of national health policy with diverse political and dis-
ciplinary persuasions have now reached a broad consensus that the
methods used to distribute the individual costs of medical care
unacceptably increase social costs.3 In particular, present forms of
financing offer perverse incentives to deliver a quality and a quan-
tity of care that, in the absence of those incentives, would not be
provided. Briefly, the present financing system is dominated by
third-party payments, either from private insurers, who in 1978
paid approximately 27% of all personal health care expenditures,
or from public entitlement programs, which pay approximately
39% of all expenditures. 4 Third-party payments reduce incentives
for consumers and providers to economize in consumption. In ad-
dition, three provisions in the tax system subsidize, and therefore
encourage, the purchase of health insurance and medical care.
First, employer contributions to employee accident and health in-
surance plans are specifically excluded from gross employee income
for federal income tax purposes. Second, an individual can deduct
one-half of his or her out-of-pocket expenditures on private health
insurance, up to $150, from personal income. Last, a taxpayer can
deduct all out-of-pocket personal health and medical expenditures
above 3% of adjusted gross income from personal income.5 Tax
3. See P. Starr, Transformation in Defeat: The Changing Objectives of National
Health Insurance, 1915-1980, at 23 (1980) (forthcoming in 71 Am. J. PUS. HEALTH). This
Article's ideas have fuller expression in a forthcoming book. P. STARE, THE SoCIAL TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1981).
4. Gibson, supra note 2, at 26 (table 5).
5. Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that employer contribu-
tions to an employee's accident or health insurance plans for personal injury or sickness is
not included in gross employee income. I.R.C. § 106. Mitchell and Phelps found, by compar-
ison of the magnitude of this tax subsidy with the loading cost of insurance, that "the extent
of the tax subsidy is greater than the cost of insurance," effectively giving negative net load-
ing rates. Across all income classes, they found that, at the time of their study, this tax
subsidy accounts for 16.7% of the cost of premiums. B. MITCHELL & C. PHELPS, EMPLOYER
PAID GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE COSTS OF MANDATED NATIONAL HEALTH COVERAGE
17 (1974), cited in K. DAvis, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: BENEFITS, COSTS AND CONSE-
QUENCES 16 (1975). Obviously, as a perquisite that is not included in taxable income, the
provision of health insurance by the employer is worth more to the employee than an equal
contribution to income, which must be discounted by the employee's marginal rate of taxa-
tion. Therefore, employees are implicitly encouraged to accept more health insurance cover-
age, even at the expense of wages, because health insurance retains its full face value. This
benefit is worth more to the high income employee than to the low income employee due to
the graduated rate of taxation.
As noted in the text, in addition to insurance exclusions from gross income, one-half of
private expenditures, up to $150, on personal health insurance is deductible from personal
income, and all personal health expenditures, including any remaining health insurance
costs, above 3% of adjusted gross income is deductible from personal income. I.R.C.
§ 213(a). Mitchell and Vogel demonstrate that these latter two provisions constitute a
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subsidies make a contribution equal to 12% of the national total
expenditures on health care. In total, more than one-half of all
medical care expenditures are financed either directly through tax
subsidies or indirectly through public entitlement programs.8 Any
major reform of the financing and delivery of American medical
care must therefore address not only questions of entitlement to
services, but also the problems of cost containment.
Proposals for reform vary widely, but each proceeds from this
common starting point.7 For those who seek change with minimal
or no expansion of governmental authority, moral exhortation to
reduce demand and more sensible economic incentives are appeal-
ing. Those who favor modest intervention would rely partly on
moral exhortation and economic incentives, but would also impose
sanctions such as health system planning or even budget caps.
Those who promote more governmental intervention favor central-
ized budgeting and bargaining structures to negotiate medical fees
and rates. At the far end of this continuum, those who advocate
maximum intervention would advance a national health service in
preference to any combination of public or private insurance and
regulation. It is those who are at this left end of the political spec-
trum that are silent now.
The minimal intervention-or "procompetitive" approach-
currently has considerable political and rhetorical appeal.' Rising
government budgets, coupled with increasingly frequent charges of
waste and inefficiency in government bureaucracies, have en-
couraged some to propose that social service delivery systems be
structured to accommodate market incentives. In medical care,
those procompetitive proponents predict that a "return" to the
market will lead to cost containment, more equitable allocation of
national program that provides partial financing of health expenditures for all taxpaying
Americans. This Internal Revenue Service health plan includes an unusually broad defini-
tion of what constitutes a medical expense, see I.R.C. § 213(e), and "has a deductible pro-
portional to income and a coinsurance rate that decreases with income." Mitchell & Vogel,
Health and Taxes: An Assessment of the Medical Deduction, 41 S. EcoN. J. 660, 665
(1975). Despite the income-related deductible of this program, the total effect is a regressive
financing mechanism, with substantially larger benefits for high income taxpayers. See Con-
rad & Marmor, Patient Cost Sharing, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CONFLICTING GOALS
AND POLICY CHOICES 385, 404 (J. Feder, J. Holahan & T. Marmor eds. 1980).
6. See generally Tax Expenditures for Health Care: Hearings Before the Task Force
on Tax Expenditures and Tax Policy of the House Comm. on the Budget and Subcomm.
on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979)
(statement of Emil M. Sunley).
7. See P. Starr, supra note 3, at 25-26.
8. See C. SCHuLTzE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 2-4 (1977).
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scarce medical resources, the creation of a more rational delivery
system, and delivery of more appropriate and perhaps better medi-
cal care. Indeed, the appeal of procompetitive arguments is so
broad that the President's Commission for a National Agenda for
the Eighties argued confidently that "an expansion of the role of
competition, consumer choice, and market incentives rather than
government control is more likely to create the much needed stim-
ulus toward greater efficiency, cost consciousness, and responsive-
ness to consumer preferences so visibly lacking in our present ar-
rangements for providing medical care."9 Similar claims have
received widespread coverage in trade journals,10 the popular
press,1 and on Capitol Hill. 2 Yet this vision of reform through
competition is uncommon among industrialized nations.
The positions advanced under this banner, while labelled
procompetitive, are, in fact, diverse and distinguishable. They vary
in the degree of change proposed for American medicine, the
rationale for such change, and their mechanisms, implementability,
and effects. Nevertheless, while three separable threads of procom-
petitive logic run through these positions, all have interrelated
elements.
The first approach would enhance consumer sovereignty. Ad-
vocates of this approach believe that the absence of significant
consumer cost sharing in insurance is the major problem in medi-
cal care. Near-complete prepayment for medical care removes the
necessity for both the consumer and the provider to make tradeoffs
among different medical services and between medical care and
other desired economic goods. It is asserted that even if the con-
sumer is not fully at risk for the cost of medical care, the use of
deductibles, coinsurance, and copayment' s will lead consumers to
9. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMUSSION FOR A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE EIGHTIES
78-79 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Christianson & McClure, Competition in the Delivery of Medical Care,
301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 812 (1979) (constructive competition helped reduce hospitalization,
contain costs, improve access to medical services, focus consumer attention on consumer
satisfaction, increase consumer choices and information); Enthoven, Rx for Health Care Ec-
onomics: Competition, Not Rigid NHI, 59 HOSPITAL PROGRESS 44 (Oct. 1978) (although
health services market not structured to fit competitive model, restructuring possible to
yield more competitive benefits).
11. Huff, A Little Healthy Competition, Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1980, § A, at 19,
col. 4.
12. See Demkovich, Competition Coming On, 12 NAT'L J. 1152 (1980); Demkovich,
New Congressional Health Leaders-The Emphasis Is on Competition, 12 NAT'L J. 1093
(1980).
13. Patient cost sharing devices are proposed as ways to make the consumer more
1006 [Vol. 34:1003
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elect more economically appropriate forms of care. The second
view contends that the medical system provides too few acceptable
alternatives to "fee for service" (FFS) payment.14 Medical compe-
tition exists within FFS medicine, not between FFS and other de-
livery and financing models, as would be preferable. Reforms
under this second view would encourage the development of groups
of physicians, primarily in prepaid group practices (PPGP)15 as al-
ternatives to FFS medicine. The proponents of the third, and last,
view advocate aggressive antitrust rulemaking and litigation to re-
duce the market power of the present medical providers.
As was stated, these three broad approaches need not be fully
independent. Antitrust action could be used to eliminate barriers
to the development of competing groups of providers, a result com-
patible with the provider reorganization approach. The cost shar-
ing approach may be required to allow existing FFS reimburse-
ment to compete with prepaid group practice.
Procompetitive proposals share questionable analyses of the
effects of current command and control regulation; they typically
conscious of the costs of medical care demand decisions, without putting the consumer at
risk for the full cost of medical care. Deductibles require that consumers pay full costs of all
medical care up to some dollar limit, beyond which the public or private insurer pays in full.
Copayment is a consumer utilization fee, charged at such time that medical care is utilized
for each service subject to copayment provisions. Coinsurance requires the consumer to pay
some portion of the total costs incurred. For an excellent discussion of the effects of cost
sharing, see M. BARm, R. EvANs & G. STODDART, CONTROLLNG HEALTH CARE COSTS BY Di-
RECT CHARGES TO PATIENTS: SNARE OR DzLusiON? (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONTROLLING
HEALTH COSTS]. For a discussion of the administrative feasibility of cost sharing proposals
under national health insurance, see Conrad & Marmor, supra note 5.
14. Under "fee for service" (FFS) payment, providers are paid on the basis of identifi-
able, billable procedures performed. This reimbursement may be on the basis of the costs
incurred by hospitals, or the charges made by physicians. Most medical care is currently
paid for on a FFS basis. This payment method implies that providers can increase their
total revenues by increasing the number of procedures performed, knowing that they will be
reimbursed for their costs or charges by the patient or the patient's insurer. Because the
provider does not often suffer losses from ordering superfluous services, implicit incentives
exist under FFS to provide medical services without regard to the costs incurred.
15. Prepaid Group Practice (PPGP) is an alternative payment mechanism intended to
address the lack of provider cost awareness under FFS reimbursement. As under insurance,
the enrollee pays a fixed capitation rate, and is entitled to medical benefits as needed. Un-
like insurance, the enrollee is contracting with an organization that not only finances medi-
cal care, but that also accepts responsibility for the delivery of care. The PPGP employs or
contracts with providers who provide medical care to the defined, prepaid enrolled popula-
tion. PPGP revenues are not open-ended. They are a function of the total number of enroll-
ees, not of the number of procedures performed. PPGP is an umbrella term, and encom-
passes a number of alternative financing and delivery mechanisms, including the Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO), Individual Practice Association (IPA), and Foundation
for Medical Care (FMC).
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compare present circumstances of regulatory disarray with future
circumstances of uncorrupted competition. They draw analogies
between regulation in health care and regulation in other indus-
tries when projecting the impacts of their proposed changes. These
analogies, however, ignore or downplay the differences between the
market for medical care and the markets for other economic goods,
as well as the many different forms of regulation that pervade the
medical care sector. In fact, although procompetitive proposals all
reject present and proposed command and control regulation, all
require "market correcting" regulation16 to improve the workings
of the market so admired. The aim of this Article is to sort out the
distinguishable reform alternatives grouped under the procompeti-
tive rubric. The concern here is to demonstrate not only the impor-
tant differences among these positions, but the differences in the
arguments on which they rely for support.
II. BACKGROUND
Economic market approaches to medical system reform are
not intrinsically concerned with cost containment. Rather, they are
intended to generate a more appropriate level of medical care utili-
zation uninfluenced by perverse economic incentives. If competi-
tive conditions 17 exist in a market environment, an equilibrium in
price and consumption results. This equilibrium is in some sense
an ideal allocation of goods and services, technically termed
"Pareto optimal.""
Attainment of this perfect allocation in the medical care mar-
ket is frustrated by the fact that the market fails to meet numer-
ous conditions for ideal competition. For example, because of the
coverage afforded by health insurance, the decision to consume
medical care is not made with limited financial resources. Health
insurance purchases are themselves not fully constrained by mar-
ket mechanisms, since tax subsidies allow market "decisions" on
insurance coverage to be made with pre-tax dollars. Moreover, em-
16. See A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRAcTIcAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING
COSTS OF MEDIcAL CARE 94 (1980).
17. These competitive conditions include: free exit and entry into the market by pro-
viders; costless transactions; perfect information on the part of consumers; voluntary
purchases by the consumer; limitations on consumer resources requiring that each purchase
be traded off against another; inability of producers to exercise market power over consum-
ers or over other providers; absence of collusive behavior by producers; payment of full costs
of production of goods or services by producers; and the absence of externalities associated
with the provision of the good or service.
18. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 462 n.12 (10th ed. 1976).
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ployer-provided group health insurance prevents consumers from
making individual market decisions about the desired level of
health insurance coverage, because the consumer-employee accepts
the insurance package offered as a perquisite of employment.
Many of these conditions that result in market failure might be
rectified through procompetitive reform.
Medical care market failures reflect, to some extent, the na-
ture of medical care itself. Medical care is different. Improved
health, the anticipated outcome of medical care, has positive exter-
nalities. This makes medical care a merit good, and, unlike many
other economic goods, one that should not be allocated solely on
the basis of ability to pay. Equity considerations must enter into
any discussion of the allocation of medical care. Market allocation,
while more "efficient" in allocating resources in response to "dollar
votes," is not directed at equitable distribution. Even subsidies to
the poor included in some market-oriented reform approaches may
not fully mitigate inequity.
Informed choice by consumers is a precondition to the success-
ful operation of the competitive market. Several characteristics of
the medical market, however, work against easy access by consum-
ers to information. First, one can never know when and if illness
and recovery from illness will occur. Also, medical care is not a
fixed, precise good; its outcome is uncertain, and the treatments
associated with a particular set of symptoms or diagnoses can dif-
fer substantially.19 Professor Arrow contends that an economic sys-
tem cannot operate fully rationally under conditions of uncer-
tainty.20 One response to uncertainty in the medical care market
and the risk it entails has been a demand for insurance. A second
response is the creation of an agency relationship between consum-
ers and physicians in which physicians are estimated to influence
or control 70% of all demand decisions.2 1
Just as differences exist between the medical market and
other economic markets, the regulation of the medical care indus-
try differs from the regulation of other sectors of the economy.
19. A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 16, at 1-12.
20. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
EcoN. Rav. 941 (1963).
21. Although only an estimated 18 cents of every health care dollar pays for actual
physician-provided services, doctors influence the expenditure of a much greater portion of
that dollar because of their ability to "determine who goes to the hospital, how long they
stay, and what will be done for them while they are there." Relnan, The Allocation of
Medical Resources by Physicians, 55 J. MED. Enuc. 99, 99 (1980).
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These differences do not lie in the regulatory tools themselves as
much as in the number and diversity of regulations emerging from
different governmental bodies and affecting the same health actor.
Hospitals, for instance, must deal with a series of agencies concern-
ing regulations tied to the subsidy and reimbursement programs on
which their existence often depends. 22 Public regulatory bodies re-
view capital expenditures (certificate of need), rates (state rate
commissions), and utilization (Professional Standards Review Or-
ganizations or PSROs). In addition, medical care providers are
subject to standards and licensure requirements imposed by both
public and private bodies.
The role of government is further complicated by its monop-
sonistic purchase of medical care for some segments of the popula-
tion and the regulation tied to this purchase. This mix of direct
regulation and regulation through finance or subsidy is very differ-
ent from that faced by other industries or economic sectors. Al-
though aspects of health regulation may resemble regulation of
public utilities or licensing of television stations, in its totality it
has a complexity all its own. While any single comparison of regu-
latory activity in another economic sector may have some rele-
vance, the sum of multiple and sometimes conflicting regulatory
activities in the health care market is on the whole not analogous
to that in any other industry.2
III. PROCOMPETITIvE PROPOSALS: EXAMINING THE DIFFERENCES
The three classes of procompetitive proposals listed earlier24
differ in their assumptions about the medical care market, the
medical product, health care goals, and appropriate policy mecha-
nisms. Each of the three views is expressed in current legislative
proposals, although the first appears to have passed its peak of
popularity, and some proposals incorporate elements of more than
one.
25
22. See Marmor, The Reform of Economic Regulation: Reactions Regarding Regula-
tory Choice in Health, in IssuEs IN HEALTH CARE REGULATION 316 (R. Gordon ed. 1980).
23. See id. at 13.
24. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
25. One or more of these broad procompetitive approaches has influenced several re-
cent legislative initiatives. During the 96th Congress, particularly the first session in the
summer and fall of 1979, when the Carter Administration's Hospital Cost Containment Act
of 1979, S. 570, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S2187 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1979), began
to flounder, a number of legislative alternatives to regulatory medical care cost containment
arose. Senator Durenberger introduced The Health Incentives Reform Act of 1979, S. 1968,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S15699 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979), which provided for a
1010 [Vol. 34:1003
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A. Enhancing Consumer Sovereignty in Medical Care
Consumption Decisions
It is widely acknowledged that "market failure" exists in med-
specified fixed dollar amount of deductible employer contributions to health insurance plans
with contributions in excess of that amount to be included in employee gross income and,
therefore, taxable. The bill mandated a choice of multiple health plans for employees, who
then would receive rebates for choosing plans less expensive than the employer contribution.
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96th CONG., 2D SEsS., DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPOS-
ALS TO RESTRUCTURE THE INCENTIVES FOR COVERAGE UNDER EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS 16-17
(Comm. Print 1980).
The Health Cost Restraint Act of 1979 was introduced by former House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman Al Ullman. H.R. 5740, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
H9970 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979). It embodied the same provisions as the Durenberger bill
and, also, contained provisions concerning HMO reimbursement under the Medicare pro-
gram that were designed to encourage Medicare recipients to choose enrollment in prepaid
group plans rather than FFS. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96th CONG., 2D
SESS., DESCRIPTION OF S. 1968 AND OTHER PROPOSALS TO RESTRUCTURE THE INCENTIVES FOR
COVERAGE UNDER EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS 12-13 (Comm. Print 1980).
Representative Martin introduced the Medical Expense Protection Act of 1980, H.R.
6405, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H532 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1980), which would have
created a "Catastrophic Automatic Protection Plan," funded by general revenues and coin-
surance. H.R. 6405, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in National Health Insurance: Hearings
Before the Subcomn. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 230 (1980). The Plan mandated for families with incomes of less than $10,000 a de-
ductible of $300, plus 20% of the income in excess of $4000, and a deductible of $1500, plus
20% of income in excess of $10,000, for families with incomes of more than $10,000. In
addition, the Plan disallowed employers the tax deduction available for qualified health in-
surance plans unless they offer this coverage to employees. See id. See also National Health
Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1980) (statement by Representative Martin).
Representative Jones introduced a bill, H.R. 3943, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
H2722 (daily ed. May 4, 1979), which would have amended the Internal Revenue Code to
disallow an employer's business deductions for costs of premiums of specified employee in-
surance contracts and mandated catastrophic coverage for health care expenses over $2000
or 15% of the employee's average adjusted gross income. See National Health Insurance:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1980) (statement of the American Hospital Association).
The Comprehensive Health Care Reform Act was introduced by Senator Schweiker. S.
1590, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S10656 (daily ed. July 26, 1979). It would have
amended the Public Health Service Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-83, §§ 102-104, 105(b), 106,
107, 91 Stat. 383-86 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and established standards
for qualified employer health benefit plans, including catastrophic coverage, and conditions
under which employer contributions to employee health insurance could be deducted by
employers and excluded from gross income by employees. The bill also mandated a multiple
health plan choice for employees and a fixed dollar contribution by the employer, with re-
bates available to employees choosing less expensive plans. See STAFF OF THE JoInT COM.
ON TA ATION, 96th CONG., 2d SEsS., DESCRIPTION OF S. 1968 AND OTHER PROPOSALS TO
RESTRUCTURE THE INCENTIVES FOR COVERAGE UNDER EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS 10 (Comm.
Print 1980).
Representatives Gephardt and Stockman introduced The National Health Care Reform
Act of 1980, H.R. 7527, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H4683 (daily ed. June 9, 1980),
which would have limited the tax subsidies for employer contributions to health insurance
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ical care. Opinions differ, however, about whether the primary
basis for market failure is inherent in the nature of medical care
itself or is generated by present financing policies. Those who ad-
vocate consumer sovereignty adhere to the latter claim. They argue
that medical markets fail because consumers never directly face
the economic consequences of their consumption decisions. This
market failure would be rectified by dramatically reshaping the
role of insurance to make patients and doctors cognizant of costs at
the time of use of medical care. One instrument to reshape insur-
ance is extensive patient cost sharing through use of deductibles,
copayment, or coinsurance. 6 Theoretically, making the consumer
responsible for significant proportions of the cost of care at the
time of use would generate economizing alertness in both patients
and doctors, since presumably the need for alertness would be
communicated from the patient to the doctor.
A second way to make consumers aware of the true cost of
medical care is to reduce or eliminate the federal tax subsidy that
now encourages the purchase of health insurance by employers. 7
Health insurance purchases would then be made with after-tax
dollars, as are the purchases of other goods.2"
plans; provided tax free rebates to employees selecting health plans costing less than the
fixed dollar contribution; provided tax credits for the private purchase of health insurance
not through the employer; mandated a catastrophic level of coverage; replaced retroactive,
reasonable cost reimbursement with prospective premium payment; repealed existing regu-
latory structures such as Certificate of Need and Professional Standards Review Organiza-
tion; mandated health plan choice under Medicare; and provided vouchers under Medicaid.
26. See Feldstein, The High Cost of Hospitals-and What to Do About It,.48 PUB.
INTEREST 40 (1977); Feldstein, A New Approach to National Health Insurance, 23 PuB.
INTEREST 93 (1971); Seidman, Income-Related Consumer Cost Sharing: A Strategy for the
Health Sector, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEvER?
307 (M. Pauly ed. 1980).
27. See note 5 supra.
28. A tax expenditure is a provision in the tax code that is intended to "achieve a
particular purpose, claimed to be desirable, other than the measurement of net income
under an income tax." Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HANv. L. REV. 705, 707
(1970). Proponents assert that tax incentives encourage the private sector to participate in
social programs and that tax incentives are simple and involve less government intervention.
See,. e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 85329-30 (1969)(statement of Senatof Percy), quoted in Surrey,
supra, at 716. Surrey, on the other hand, argues that any tax expenditure could be replaced
by a direct expenditure. A tax incentive will have some legislative appeal partially because
of the asserted advantages of tax expenditures and partially because of the structure of the
legislative process-the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee consider all tax proposals. When tax proposals, however, concern indirect program
outlays, as opposed to revenue gathering, consideration by these committees of these pro-
posals defeats the committee system of distributing congressional expertise and affects the
administration of the program. See Surrey, supra, at 728-29. Professor Surrey, in his criti-
1012 [Vol. 34:1003
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Support for these forms of enhanced consumer sovereignty
rests on two premises about incentives in medical care. First, the
existence of massive prepayment for medical care through health
insurance is, in this view, the prime cause of overuse. Because the
purchase of insurance represents both a prepayment and a preallo-
cation of consumer resources toward the purchase of medical care,
consumers do not have to trade off the cost of medical care against
the cost of other desired goods and services at the time of use.2 9
From this perspective, first-dollar health insurance-insurance
with a very low or nonexistent deductible-is not properly insur-
ance. It does not really spread the risk of high cost, low probability
illness, but prepays relatively common, highly discretionary ser-
vices.3 0 Second, tax subsidies lead to the provision of excessive
levels of health insurance."1 Eliminating the tax subsidy for the
provision of health insurance by employers will lead consumers to
purchase an "economically rational" level of coverage. This level of
coverage, combined with cost sharing, will translate into more ap-
propriate levels of demand for and utilization of medical care.2
cism of tax expenditures, further notes that their costs are uncontrollable, unpredictable,
and largely hidden in foregone revenues rather than in budgeted outlays. See id. at 729-31.
Moreover, tax incentives, in general, are intrinsically inequitable in a positive, progressive
income tax system. See id. at 720-25. For a complete discussion of tax expenditures, see S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973).
29. See Feldstein & Taylor, The Rapid Rise of Hospital Costs, in CouNcIL ON WAGE &
PRICE STAITY STAFF REPORT, Jan. 1977, at 66-67 (well insured consumers choose more
expensive medical care than those "not so well insured").
30. Insurance should protect against large losses that are very unlikely to occur-that
is, an expensive event that will occur in only a few cases. In such a case, the extent of the
risk is so great that very few individuals could afford to suffer the risk, but the likelihood of
the event occurring is so small that the pooled risk is minute-and consequently inexpen-
sive-through a risk-sharing mechanism. According to Arrow, "if the costs of medical care
are a random variable with mean m, the [ideal insurer] will charge a premium m, and agree
to indemnify ... for all medical costs." Arrow, supra note 20, at 960 (emphasis in original).
Thus, actuarially, a fair insurance premium will simply be the projected total cost of health
care to the population at risk, divided by the number of people in that population. See id. at
959-60. Because of administrative costs, or "loading costs," incurred in the provision of in-
surance, however, the cost to the individual will be higher than the expected benefits from
insurance. In spite of this, risk aversion in the face of potentially severe or catastrophic costs
causes individuals to insure. The institutionalization of risk-bearing through insurance
serves to relieve much of the economic uncertainty associated with accident and disease.
Health insurance, however, does not fit the ideal model of insurance. So-called "moral haz-
ard" is present when the consumption of an insured good is altered by the possession of
insurance. The implication is that there is a relatively high elasticity of demand or consider-
able consumer discretion regarding demand decisions. It is this tendency to over-utilize
medical services because of prepayment through insurance that concerns cost sharing
proponents.
31. A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 16, at 19.
32. See generally M. Feldstein & E. Allison, Tax Subsidies of Private Health Insur-
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The intellectual appeal of the cost sharing component of the
consumer sovereignty approach depends partially on one's view of
the elasticity of demand for medical services. The elasticity of de-
mand clearly varies for* different types of services. Low cost, high
probability, discretionary services have the highest elasticity; their
use varies considerably depending on costs to patients. The elastic-
ity of demand for high cost care, however, is low, with physicians
dominating consumption choices. Given these elasticities, one
would expect that cost sharing would primarily affect demand for
services of the first type. Nevertheless, low cost, discretionary ser-
vices are not necessarily the type to be limited. High cost, high
technology, high intensity services are partially, and perhaps pri-
marily, responsible both for the rapid rise in medical sector ex-
penditures and for the doubts about the worth of such expendi-
tures. Cost sharing would not directly alter the major pressures
toward consumption of this type of care since most episodes of
high cost care exceed the limit of any feasible deductible.
The appeal of cost sharing can also vary with one's views on
the need for equity in the distribution of care. Cost sharing
amounts to a tax or user fee imposed on the sick and is a de facto
transfer of wealth from the sick to the healthy. If cost sharing obli-
gations are determined without regard to income, a fixed sum lia-
bility will have a greater impact on lower income than higher in-
come groups: "[C]harges whose aggregate levels for a given family
are direct functions of utilization only will involve perverse wealth
transfers-from the ill to the healthy and, to the extent that the
poor (including a significant share of the aged) are less healthy
than the rich, from low- to high-income classes."33 The income-re-
lated cost sharing plans do not create this vertical inequity, but
they do retain the peculiar horizontal inequity of transferring
wealth from the sick to the healthy within income classes.
The major impact of cost sharing may well be on the demand
for preventive care. Demand for this type of care is the most highly
responsive to price, because it is the most discretionary. The Cali-
fornia Medicaid program's experiment with copayments demon-
strated that "[tihe inhibiting effect applied to office visits-the
bedrock of general medical care-and also to typical diagnostic
tests (urinalyses), to preventive procedures (Pap smears), and to
ance: Distribution, Revenue Loss and Effects 16 (Oct. 1972) (Health Care Policy Discussion
Paper No. 2, Harvard Center for Community Health and Medical Care, Program on Health
Care Policy).
33. CONTROLLING HEALTH CosTs, supra note 13, at 111.
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drug prescriptions. '3 4
Admittedly, coinsurance may have some desirable cost con-
straining effect if consumers question the utility of increasing ser-
vice intensity in the form of increased bed days and superfluous
tests. In the absence of upper limits on consumer liability, how-
ever, this form of cost sharing imposes serious financial burdens on
the catastrophically ill. Enthoven, a champion of restructured com-
petition, contends that cost sharing not only fails to reduce over-
utilization, but its timing is inappropriate:
The individual episode of medical care is usually not good material for ra-
tional economic calculation. If the patient is in pain or urgent need of care,
the transaction is not entirely voluntary. The sick or worried patient is in a
poor position to make an economic analysis of treatment alternatives. When
my injured child is lying bleeding on the operating table is hardly the time
when I want to negotiate with the doctor over fees or the number of sutures
that will be used.3 5
Consumers may prefer, and be prepared to pay for, first-dollar
health insurance coverage precisely because they do not want to
make decisions about economic tradeoffs while under care. When
dealing with potentially life and death decisions, which almost in-
variably involve discomfort, consumers do not want to use eco-
nomic criteria.38 "[T]he evidence in Canada and in Medicare in
this country is that consumers with their own money will supple-
ment even weak deductibles; the evidence of labor group bargain-
ing, individual health insurance policies, and the Federal Employ-
ees options is that people want comprehensive insurance, not
strongly cost-shared insurance. ' 3 7
One major effect of mandated consumer cost sharing would be
that those who can afford supplementary insurance will choose to
purchase it and circumvent cost sharing provisions. Supplementa-
tion leads to cost spreading among the affluent, which shifts the
34. Roemer, Hopkins, Carr & Gartside, Copayments for Ambulatory Care: Penny-
Wise and Pound-Foolish, 13 MED. CARE 457, 464 (1975).
35. A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 16, at 34-35.
36. See B. Vladeck, The Market vs. Regulation: The Case for Regulation 4 (May 22,
1980 as revised June 13, 1980) (paper presented at the Symposium on Health Care Regula-
tion and Competition: Are They Compatible?, Project HOPE Institute for Health Policy
Study). Ironically, if consumers do make coverage decisions on an economic basis, based on
their assessment of the likelihood of needing care, adverse self-selection consequences may
result.
37. McClure, An Analysis of Health Care System Performance Under a Proposed
NHI Administrative Mechanism, in EFFEcTs OF THE PAYMENT MECHANSM ON THE HATH
CARE DELvERY SYSTEM 12 (1977) (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public
Health Service).
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burden of payment to insurers and to the low income patients and
potentially reduces equity in access. Those unable to afford supple-
mentary insurance will be subject to the barriers of access imposed
by cost sharing.
The powerful consumer preference for health insurance un-
constrained by cost sharing also implies that reducing tax subsidies
may have little effect on the aggregate level of health insurance
coverage. While no doubt affected by tax incentives, the level of
first-dollar coverage may not depend solely on that subsidy. Fail-
ure to consider properly the Canadian experience with private sup-
plementation in the absence of tax incentives 8 could lead to an
over-emphasis of the importance of tax incentives to choices on
coverage. If the level of insurance remains unchanged after reduc-
ing tax subsidies, that reduction raises the rate of taxation on em-
ployment. If reducing the tax subsidy does lower the level of insur-
ance purchased, employees' salaries should be increased to
compensate for this loss. This too would represent an increased tax
on employment.,9
A final question regarding the consumer sovereignty approach
relates to its structural effects-that is, how the various elements
of the approach would affect competition between providers. The
competitive market relies on consumer choice between providers
on the basis of prices that reflect differences in the provision of
services. While cost sharing consumers would be aware of the costs
of their decisions and might be deterred from consumption, they
would face no incentives to shop for a more efficient medical pro-
vider when the charges they pay are uniform for all providers.
"The major weakness of the uniform-charge plans as cost control
mechanisms is that uniformity allows no scope for price-sensitive
consumers to affect provider market shares. '40
B. Encouraging Alternative Organization of Providers
The second class of reforms would provide incentives to
restructure medical care, primarily by encouraging the develop-
ment of competing groups of physicians. The class is best illus-
trated by three proposals: Enthoven's Consumer Choice Health
38. See Conrad & Marmor, supra note 13, at 408-09.
39. See W. Lynk, Regulation of the Employer-Employee Relationship: The "Con-
sumer Choice Health Plan", 10-11 (Aug. 1980) (forthcoming in 6 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
L.).
40. CONTROLLING HEALTH COSTS, supra note 13, at 115.
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Plan (CCHP),'41 McClure's broadened definition of health plans, 42
and Elwood's Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) strat-
egy.4" These proposals acknowledge that it is socially necessary
both to insure against uncertainty and to provide needed access to
medical care without requiring patients to make economic deci-
sions at the time care is needed. They propose that consumers be
free to choose between annual packages of comprehensive health
care, and to either retain the savings accrued if they choose a pack-
age offered at a price beneath the payment their employer or the
government is willing to contribute for benefits, or pay the differ-
ence if they elect a more expensive option. This approach would
put the existing FFS form of medical care payment in competition
with alternative financing and delivery mechanisms-primarily
prepaid group practices-on the basis of their ability to deliver ad-
equate services for a competitive premium price.
Proponents of alternative forms of delivery have several
slightly different conceptions of the optimal structure for these al-
ternative organizations. Frech and Ginsburg argue that "HMOs are
likely to change the nature of the market for medical care toward
greater competition."4 4 Moore advocates Primary Care Networks,
as implemented by United Health Care of SAFECO Insurance."
Evans recommends Physician Based Group Insurance (PBGI) as a
means of controlling costs; this system puts primary care physi-
cians at financial risk for their patients by requiring that all costs
of medical care ordered by the physician be paid out of funds pro-
spectively allocated for such care.46 The strategy as a whole, how-
ever, depends both on competition between similar systems on the
basis of their ability to offer similar benefit packages at competi-
tive prices, and on competition between different health care pack-
41. A. ENHOvEN, supra note 16. See also Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan
(pts. 1-2), 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 650, 709 (1978); Enthoven, Cutting Cost Without Cutting
the Quality of Care, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1229 (1978).
42. McClure, On Broadening the Definition of and Removing the Regulatory Barriers
to a Competitive Health Care System. 3 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 303 (1978).
43. Elwood, Anderson, Billings, Carlson, Houghberg & McClure, Health Maintenance
Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291 (1971).
44. H. FRECH & P. GINSBURG, PUBLIC INSURANCE IN PRIVATE MEDICAL MARKETS: SOME
PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 58 (1978).
45. Moore, Cost Containment Through Risk-Sharing by Primary-Care Physicians,
300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1359 (1979). See also Moore, Martin, Richardson & Riedel, Cost
Containment Through Risk-Sharing by Primary Care Physicians: A History of the Devel-
opment of United Health Care, 1 HEAILTH CARE FINANCING REv. 1 (Spring 1980).
46. Evans, Physician-Based Group Insurance: A Proposal for Medical Cost Control,
302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1280 (1980).
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ages altogether. Enthoven claims that encouragement of competing
provider groups establishes ". . . a framework within which prov-
iders can offer very different values, depending on the tastes of the
patients served. 4 7 The premium charged by a provider group
would thus be related to their ability to control costs, while the
group still provides the services that consumers desire.
Proponents of this approach have suggested ways to remove
the numerous obstacles to the development and successful opera-
tion of alternative delivery systems. These obstacles include the
market power and domination of existing providers and provider
groups; the cost or charge-based reimbursement under FFS, which
provides no consumer incentive to search for lower cost forms of
care; the employer-centered provision of a single type and level of
health insurance, which prevents consumer choice of alternative
health plans; and the difficulty of obtaining the capital financing
and enrollees necessary to start alternative health plans.
Perhaps the primary barrier to the development of alternative
delivery systems is the prevalence of employer provision of a single
health insurance plan to all employees. 48 Like cost sharing enthusi-
asts, those advocating provider reorganization would weaken the
employer link to health insurance by limiting or eliminating the
tax subsidy of employer-provided health insurance benefits. Health
insurance is typically offered as a perquisite of employment, and if
the employee has any decision to make regarding health insurance
coverage, it is to maximize the total salary and benefit package
when choosing a job. Under existing arrangements, insurers com-
pete with each other to offer the most comprehensive set of bene-
fits to each employer while minimizing the cost of the total benefit
package. Employers are assumed to act as relatively informed buy-
ers in this purchase, attempting to maximize benefits at minimum
cost.
Both the consumer sovereignty advocates and the proponents
of provider competition identify the consumer as the best judge of
what insurance to buy. Multiple choice proposals would both in-
crease consumer participation in decisionmaking and increase the
opportunities for competitive alternatives to develop. If the em-
ployer continues to pay the full costs of employee choices, existing
tax law encourages employees to maximize their income by electing
47. A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 16, at 67.
48. Enthoven, Consumer-centered vs. Job-centered Health Insurance, 57 HARv. Bus.
REv. 141 (1979).
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the most comprehensive and expensive level of coverage regardless
of their perceived need. Conversely, offering fixed dollar employer
subsidies to each employee would make the employee aware of and
responsible for the fiscal effects of his choice of coverage. If the
employee elects a level of coverage costing more than the fixed
contribution, the difference must be paid out-of-pocket. Ideally,
this out-of-pocket payment would not be deductible for tax pur-
poses from total income, as it is under current law. If the employee
elects a level of coverage costing less than the fixed contribution,
the difference should be returned to the employee through rebates.
This rebate should not be subjected to income tax if the employer-
paid subsidy is not taxed. These steps eliminate any tax incentive
to choose a higher level of insurance coverage than is perceived by
the employee to be necessary. They would, however, produce fun-
damental irregularities in the income tax structure if cash income
from rebates were excluded from gross income.
It is conceivable that the employer contribution could vary on
the basis of such factors as the demographic characteristics, social
class, or income of the employees in order to make the subsidy
actuarially fair. It is important, however, that the subsidy not vary
with the choice of the level of coverage and that the election of a
more expensive form of care not be implicitly or explicitly re-
warded. With that provision, then, proponents of this reform ap-
proach argue that fixed-dollar employer subsidies in conjunction
with multiple choice of health plans and a limit on the tax subsidy
available to health insurance would result in fundamental changes
in the medical care financing and delivery system.
Multiple choice by employees is currently mandated in areas
that have a federally qualified HMO. The "dual choice" option,
however, is not aggressively marketed to employees, and many ar-
eas are still unserved by HMOs. Moreover, some established
HMOs do not seek federal qualification. The existing dual choice
option has therefore had little impact. Regulations require that
federally qualified HMOs offer certain benefits. This requirement
may reduce the effects of multiple choice where HMOs do exist
and may inhibit the development of HMOs. As McClure has
stated, "In order for consumers choosing efficient plans to be re-
warded, multiple choice arrangements must allow competing plans
some flexibility to establish benefits and premiums they believe
consumers will find attractive .... Effective market forces are im-
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possible if all consumer benefits and premiums are fixed."4' The
major successful implementation of multiple choice currently in
operation is the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
(FEHBP). FEHBP has, however, not been a particularly striking
model of cost containment, although it does prove the administra-
tive feasibility of employer-provided multiple health plan choice.
Multiple choice and alternative provider systems could result
in a two-tiered system of medical care that divides the poor, who
will of necessity choose low coverage, from the relatively affluent,
who will choose higher levels of coverage. On the other hand, it
may result in a two-tiered system that separates the relatively
healthy from the relatively sick, as low cost medical care develops
for low risk individuals and a high cost system develops for high
risk populations-a dilemma that present forms of employer-pro-
vided group insurance do not create. The latter system could be
prohibitively expensive for the high risk population, particularly if
tax subsidies for the purchase of health insurance are eliminated.
Proponents of systemic reorganization rely on the experience
of HMOs in areas of the country where they have a relatively large
market share as an analogy for nationwide HMO success. The
Minneapolis-St. Paul region is often cited to demonstrate the po-
tential impact of alternative health plans on cost and utilization. 0
Moreover, a recently completed study demonstrated that the costs
in a prepaid health plan in Seattle were lower than costs in a com-
peting FFS plan. The study also found that the similarities be-
tween the two plans regarding access to care were more striking
than the differences. 51 While studies have generally demonstrated
lower hospitalization for PPGP enrollees than for those individuals
covered by conventional insurance, it is unclear why this difference
occurs and whether it has any effect on the local FFS market. Ex-
isting studies have not conclusively demonstrated that this lower
utilization is not due to enrollee differences through self-selection,
a process in which less healthy individuals elect more comprehen-
sive coverage.52 If self-selection and enrollment of a relatively
healthy population is, in fact, the explanation for lowered hospital
49. McClure, supra note 42, at 307.
50. See Christianson & McClure, supra note 10, at 812-18.
51. COMPARISONS OF PREPAID HEALTH CARE PLANS N A ComPETrra MAKT THE Sz-
ATTLE PREPAID HEALTH CARE PROJECT-RESEARCH SUMMARY, cited in NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, NCHSR RESEARCH Acnvrrms (Jan. 1981).
52. Luft, Feder, Holahan & Lennox, Health Maintenance Organizations, in NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE: CONFLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES, supra note 5, at 129, 130.
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utilization in HMOs, then the total effect of HMOs on hospital
utilization may be minimal, and the end result may be to en-
courage development of a high cost system of care for high risk
populations and a lower cost system for low medical care utilizers.
In addition to doubts about the efficacy of programs for orga-
nizational restructuring, questions arise about the likelihood that
the preconditions for successful reform on such a massive scale can
be met. Proponents of competitive alternatives acknowledge that it
will take time for this competition to develop. In fact, it is esti-
mated that if current circumstances continue, only 10% of the
population could be covered by HMOs by 1990,5S up from the cur-
rent 4% enrollment rate. The capital needed to support the
fledgling HMOs has been difficult to raise, and attempting to at-
tract enrollees who are accustomed to the established FFS system
is expensive. The existence of these barriers does not imply that
reform outcomes would be less preferable than the current system;
they only suggest that it is highly questionable whether the final
form of a medical care system incorporating organizational compe-
tition will closely resemble the vision of its advocates.
C. The Antitrust Approach
The application of antitrust law to the problems of the medi-
cal care system is the third approach to reform. Similarities under-
lie the assumptions about antitrust initiatives and the alternatives
discussed earlier in this Article, including a generalized preference
among procompetitive advocates for market allocation mechanisms
in medical care. The policies prescribed to increase competitive be-
havior, however, differ. The reformers previously discussed assume
that consumers, medical care providers, and financiers are reacting
rationally to perverse economic incentives. Thus, restructuring
financial systems and altering the reimbursement systems would
allow competition to develop on the basis of price. The advocates
of antitrust have a different conception of the problem. They con-
tend that collusive behavior on the part of established medical
providers prevents the emergence of competition in the market for
medical care.
Antitrust law places singular emphasis on the benefits of com-
53. OFFICE OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, PROJECTIONS FOR HMO DEVELOPMENT, 1980-1990 (1980), cited in A. Miller & M.
Miller, Options for Health and Health Care: The Coming of Post-Clinical Medicine (forth-
coming 1981).
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petition. Havighurst has stated that "antitrust doctrine leaves very
little room to ask whether competition is a good or bad thing. The
law presumes that it is the most desirable way to organize and
carry on any form of economic activity that Congress has not made
exempt from the antitrust laws. ' 54 The antitrust preference for
competition above any other goal implies that any cost containing
effects of physician or medical system organization should be re-
jected if the effects are brought about through a lack of competi-
tion or by the domination of the market by a particular group.
"Antitrust laws were created and have been enforced to prevent
marketplace participants from colluding to disrupt an otherwise ef-
fective market. The aim of antitrust interventions is to maintain a
competitive market, which is viewed as the ideal." 55
While responsibility for antitrust enforcement rests with both
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), it is the FTC that is most actively involved in studying the
medical market. The FTC is concerned with activity that poten-
tially violates section one of the Sherman Act, which prohibits con-
tracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, and
with violations of the Clayton Act.5 6 Under its enabling legislation,
the FTC is authorized to conduct investigations of possible viola-
tions of both Acts.57 "The primary enforcement tool is the 'Cease
and Desist Order,' enforceable under threat of civil penalties, court
injunctions and contempt citations. ... The FTC also enacts
trade regulations and industry guidelines, recommends Congres-
sional legislation, and seeks to influence other government
agencies."58
The FTC's ability to initiate antitrust action in the medical
care field was enhanced recently by two Supreme Court rulings. In
1975 the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar59 deter-
mined that the "learned professions," including the medical pro-
54. Havighurst, The Antitrust Laws, the Federal Trade Commission, and Cost Con-
tainment, 56 BULL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 170 (1980).
55. Drake & Kozak, A Primer on Antitrust and Hospital Regulation, 3 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 328, 330 (1978).
56. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)).
57. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (Supp. HI 1979)).
58. Avellone & Moore, The Federal Trade Commission Enters a New Arena: Health
Services, 299 Nzw ENG. J. MED. 478 (1978).
59. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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fession, were not exempt from the antitrust laws.6 ° In 1976 the
Court ruled in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital1
"that hospitals were sufficiently involved in interstate commerce to
warrant federal application of the antitrust laws. ' 62 The FTC is
presently investigating the medical profession to determine if anti-
trust violations are present, and whether these violations, if pre-
sent, have been responsible for medical cost inflation. Aspects of
that investigation include the anticompetitive impact of the Amer-
ican Medical Association (AMA) ban on physician advertising;63
the effect of provider influence on the accreditation of medical
schools and the consequent control over the supply of physicians;"
the inhibiting effect of established providers on the growth of phy-
sician groups and HMOs;6 5 and the anticompetitive impact of phy-
sician domination of third-party reimbursement mechanisms."6
Fundamental conflicts exist between the traditional practice of
medicine and the ideal of antitrust proponents. As Havighurst
explains,
The dominant premise of profession-sponsored reforms in the financing and
delivery of medical care-that is, in the economic organization of care-has
been that the public should look to the profession rather than to the individ-
ual competitive behavior for solutions to any problems that exist. Traditional
antitrust doctrine, however, rejects the premise that industry-wide groups
can serve as unbiased arbiters of price, quantity, quality, and other economic
matters, and demands instead that decisions on such matters be made on a
decentralized competitive basis, by producers whose ability to further their
own interests is checked by the need to satisfy consumers. Moreover, this
principle applies even when it is unclear that market forces can be immedi-
ately or totally effective.67
Antitrust will support the development of competitive alternatives
that are not collusive and do not dominate the market. Antitrust
standards, however, will likely be applied to the medical industry
when physicians attempt to exercise their market power through
boycotts of medical groups, restrictions on how physicians sell
their services, prescription of payment methods, or domination of
utilization review through insistence on peer review.68
60. See Avellone & Moore, supra note 58, at 478.
61. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
62. Drake & Kozak, supra note 55, at 340; see 425 U.S. at 744-47.
63. Avellone & Moore, supra note 58, at 479.
64. Id. at 480.
65. Id. at 481.
66. Id. at 482.
67. Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Service Industry: What Does
It All Mean?, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 89, 96-97 (1980).
68. Havighurst & Hackbarth, Enforcing the Rules of Free Enterprise in an Imperfect
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Havighurst contends that existing financing mechanisms have
developed in response to the demands of the profession. "The
greatest obstacle to third-party cost containment," he asserts, "is
the willingness, even eagerness, of doctors to act collectively to
halt, dilute, co-opt, or capture any cost-containment measures that
they find objectionable or threatening. ' ' s9 The power of organized
medicine, in Havighust's opinion, lies in "the implicit threat of
boycott facing any plan which departs from accepted practice
without professional approval. . . . Removal of that threat should
permit competition finally to stimulate insurers and others to de-
velop more effective cost-containment measures." ' These cost con-
tainment alternatives, however, are themselves acceptable only if
they are not collusive in nature. This is particularly applicable to
provider domination of third-party payment plans. In recognition
of the power that physician groups and medical societies can wield
over markets, the FTC's Bureau of Competition in April 1979,
"... recommended to the Commission that it propose a trade reg-
ulation rule to divest organized medicine of control over various
health care financing plans.1 11 This proposed rule would probably
affect not only the Blue Shield physician payment plans but also
emerging financial arrangements that either are controlled by phy-
sicians or include a large proportion of the physicians in a commu-
nity. Antitrust law requires opposition to provider control of the
market even when that control is alleged to have a beneficial im-
pact on prices. Havighurst suggests that "the insight that the effect
on competition, not prices, is the crucial issue will be particularly
relevant in deciding whether to adopt a rule governing profession-
sponsored IPAs [Individual Practice Association]," one form of
physician controlled organization that the rule would probably ad-
dress.72 He concludes that applying antitrust law to IPAs is reason-
able. "The IPA," he contends, "is simply a way of reorganizing the
monopoly's internal operations so that the profession can better
protect itself against both government intrusion and competitive
Market: The Case of Individual Practice Associations 18-19 (Sept. 25-26, 1980) (paper
presented at A Conference on Health Care-Professional Ethics, Government Regulation,
or Markets?, American Enterprise Institute). See also Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scru-
tiny of the Health Professions: Developing a Framework for Assessing Private Restraints,
34 VAND. L. REv. 927 (1981).
69. Havighurst, The Role of Competition in Cost Containment, in COMPTrTIoN IN THE
HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 299 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978).
70. Id. at 313.
71. Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 68, at 6.
72. Id. at 15.
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developments,""3 regardless of the apparent effects on price.
The antitrust proposals have some immediate potential for
implementation. Unlike other procompetitive reforms, they require
no explicit legislative initiative. In fact, if evidence of antitrust vio-
lations is present, antitrust action is mandated. Moreover, since
antitrust actions can be instituted at a state level, as well as by
private citizens, competitive reform through antitrust need not
await action by federal agencies.
In considering antitrust potential in the medical industry,
however, it is useful to raise issues of the feasibility and desirabil-
ity of antitrust action. Conceptually, an analysis of the Oregon
State Medical Society actions in the 1930s and 1940s suggests that
the antitrust laws may play a potentially effective role in increas-
ing competition in the medical industry by reducing the market
power of medical stakeholders.74 Antitrust litigation may also be
applicable, and possibly effective, in the case of provider domina-
tion of medical school accreditation and the AMA ban on physi-
cian advertising, if the adverse impact on competition of these pro-
vider activities can be demonstrated. Both of these examples
involve national policies promulgated by the Liaison Committee on
Medical Education and the AMA. It is possible, therefore, to con-
centrate antitrust action on identifiable national targets. Arguably,
however, antitrust litigation is unlikely to have an appreciable im-
pact on collusive behavior by physicians in individual communi-
ties. The absolute number of physicians, physician groups, and
medical societies and organizations suggests that the national im-
pact of a few antitrust lawsuits may be minimal. Alternatively, if
antitrust litigation does have a pervasive impact on physician be-
havior in groups, the fear of an antitrust violation may have a par-
alyzing rebound effect, thereby inhibiting the development of al-
ternative medical plans.
Similarly, proposed trade regulation rules to prevent provider
control of payment plans are unlikely to be effective because of the
decentralized nature of the medical care system, the many poten-
tial sources of violations, and the limited resources available to
spend on enforcement activities. The competitive preference of an-
titrust proponents is premised in part on the failure of current reg-
ulations to alleviate the problems of the medical care industry. The
73. Id. at 26.
74. Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-Controlled Health Insurance:
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 48 (1977).
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conventional regulatory critique is partially based on the difficulty
of constraining a decentralized industry characterized by a large
number of diverse provider institutions. Yet antitrust rulemaking
appears in that sense subject to the same critique as command and
control regulation.
Additionally, efficiency questions aside, the agency's lack of re-
sources and threats from Capitol Hill combine to dilute the likely
impact of antitrust approaches to medical system reform. The ulti-
mate impact of antitrust actions will depend on the resources
available to the FTC, their ability to target those resources effec-
tively, and the ability of providers to fight antitrust litigation or to
ignore FTC trade regulation rules.
Even if capable of implementation, it is also questionable
whether antitrust is the sensible response to the problems of the
medical industry. While competition may be a desirable means to
an end, it is not obviously an end in itself in the medical care in-
dustry. Medical care is not a good that should be allocated solely
by the market. Even more than other procompetitive approaches,
antitrust actions are committed to competition for its own sake,
with less regard to its impact on costs and the atmosphere of medi-
cal practice. Rather than forcing the FTC to attack the medical
care system in the name of idealized competition, the antitrust de-
bate should perhaps return to the legislative arena, where Congress
can decide whether the peculiarities of health economics require
that some aspects of medical care be exempt from the antitrust
laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
The health policy arena is politically unbalanced, with concen-
trated provider interests juxtaposed against the diffuse interests of
consumers. This imbalance alone would imply little or no sus-
tained interest in cost containment or structural reform. The in-
creasing role of the government as financier and purchaser of med-
ical care, however, has concentrated its interest in controlling costs
in the medical sector. The health care industry is increasingly alert
to the presence of that new player. Like the Voluntary Effort by
the hospital industry, 5 procompetitive proposals are efforts to pre-
empt government cost-containment strategies. All of the major re-
75. In 1977, in response to the threat of President Carter's hospital cost containment
legislation, the hospital industry developed the Voluntary Effort, a program to voluntarily
lower hospital costs without the pressure of publicly mandated cost containment.
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form approaches are politically volatile. The role of government in
controlling medical costs and changing the patterns of financing
and delivering care generates intense ideological struggle. This
type of political dispute typically continues until legislative stale-
mate is broken by major political-electoral realignments.
National health insurance and hospital cost containment have
indeed been stalemated health issues. The position of the Reagan
Administration in early 1981, however, is clear. As President Rea-
gan stated in his Inaugural Address, "In this present crisis, govern-
ment is not the solution to our problem; government is the prob-
lem."7' The preliminary Reagan economic program intends to
phase out federal regulation of the medical industry: "If competi-
tive forces are to restrain costs, free entry into health care markets
is essential."7 The new administration preference for free market,
private sector initiatives, coupled with the new Republican major-
ity in the Senate, could well break the national health policy dead-
lock. On the other hand, it could merely be the articulated ratio-
nale for reducing the regulations that constrain the profits of some
parts of the health care sector, with real competition receiving only
nominal support.
Procompetitive proposals represent one class of responses to
the worrisome directions American medicine has taken in the past
decade. Changes that would enhance the market structure in the
long run, however, do not provide solutions to the immediate crisis.
The encouragement of alternative delivery mechanisms would not
solve immediate problems with geographic maldistribution of med-
ical resources. The possible attainment of a long-run market equi-
librium would not solve current cost problems. Even if "equilib-
rium" were possible, it would be slow to evolve 8 and until it did,
there might be significant underinvestment in health care by rela-
tively uninformed consumers. One must wonder whether we as a
society would be willing to tolerate the effects of consumer miscal-
culations in their consumption choices regarding levels of coverage
under, for example, restructured delivery systems. Caveat emptor
can hardly be casually applied to medical care.
Finally, procompetitive proposals are not themselves cost-con-
tainment strategies, although cost containment is frequently cited
76. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 1.
77. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AMERICA's NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 6-22 (Feb. 19, 1981).
78. See Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn
Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965 (1981).
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as the expected result of increased competition. In fact, should
market allocation in health care dominate, total expenditures on
health could be higher than the current levels, although public
costs may be lowered. To the extent that they merely shift costs
from the government health budget to the private sector, the fiscal
gains are socially illusory.
It is not the purpose of this Article to reject all features of
procompetitive proposals. Competitive health plans, multiple
health plan choice, provider and consumer cost consciousness, and
antitrust activity all may have some place in a larger strategy to
rationalize the medical care system. Each of the proposals has
some advantages in terms of increasing consumer choice and alter-
ing the balance of power between existing actors. As an approach
to universal medical care system reform, however, competition
alone is inadequate. In fact, one could argue that the most techni-
cally feasible way to both rationalize the medical care system and
reduce total societal expenditures on health would be to national-
ize a public budget for health care and to pass the total costs of
medical care through the political budgetary process.79 Total socie-
tal costs might actually be reduced by increasing the program costs
to government, as long as public authority is, as in Canada, ade-
quately increased. The centralization of regulatory and allocative
decisions could well result in a more suitably restrained form of
American medicine. That, however, is a discussion about the alter-
natives to procompetitive proposals, rather than the problems of
procompetitive proposals, and is therefore beyond the scope of this
Article. °
79. See Marmor, Wittman & Heagy, The Politics of Medical Inflation, 1 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 69 (1976).
80. For an exploration of such alternatives, see NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CON-
FLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES, supra note 5; A. Miller & M. Miller, supra note 53.
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